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jj<)ared tw nty yea.re ,ago ln the Himalayan
upheaval of the Chln~e revolution. We need
to seo the sl tuatlon not through the fog of
an old and stagnant hostility but In the light
of the enduring tutertsts of the United States
1.1 the Western Pacific.
In th'.s context we will better be able to
find appropriate responses at appropriate
tl ucs to the specific problems of the Stool
relatlo
lp, whether they have to do
with U.N representation or diplomatic
recognl tlon or the o!Tshore lsla.nds or whatever. Without prior adjustmPnt In perspective, however to eek tp deal definitively
with the: e questions. would be, to say the
,east, an exercise In !utll!ty.
I hould emphasize before concluding that
It 1s un11lcely that there wlll be any eager
Chinese responses to Initiatives on our part.
Nevertheless. I see nothing to be lost for this
nation In trying to move along the l!nes
which have been suggested. Chinese Intransigence Is no l!cense for American Intransigence. Our stake In the situation In the
Western Pac!tl.c Is too large !or that sort of
Infantile Indulgence.
I see great relevance In thinldng deeply
of the Issues which divide China and the
United States to see 11 they can be recast
In new and uncluttered molds. There Is every
reason, especially for young people, to
examine most closely the premises of policy
regarding China which were enshrined aJmoat two decades ago. The fact Is that the
breakdown In Chlnese-U S. relations was one
or the great !allures of my generation and
It Is highly doubtful that Its full repair shall
be seen In my ll!etlme. The problem. therefore will !a.lllargely to you.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S JOURNEY TO

Incidentally, he will be the first American Chief of State to visit the People's
Republic of China and also when he visits
Moscow in May, he will be the first American Chief of State to visit the S0\1 t
Union.
Mr. President, about 4 years ago, the
University of Montana initiated a new
public lecture series. The University wa.s
kind enough to invite me to deliver the
first address. In contrast to today, the
subject which wa.s selected was not much
in the public awareness in those days.
The remarks were entitled "China Retrospect, and Prospect."
I have just reread the statement which
I delivered at the University on March
29, 1968. It was, in general, a plea to the
largely student-audience to cut away the
shackles of thought which an older generation, of which I am a part, had selfimposed on itself in its reactions to the
cataclysmic experience of the Chinese
revolution. I urged the students to examine new approaches, approaches which
might provide the beginnings of a. beginning in restoring relations of peace with
China..
For the most, the approaches which
were discussed then have now been incorporated into the fore1gn policies of the
Nation. President Nixon has played an
exceptional personal role in bnnging
about this transition. He has ended the
boycott on Chinese goods. He has not
only removed the ban on travel to China
Tllis wa.s delivered to the student body
but has given encouragement to visits, at the University of Montana at Missoula,
through his words and. of course, his per- but it applied to all young people all
sonal example.
over the country.
Most pertinent, the President ha.s
It Is not a particularly happy Inheritance, ·
acted to change the language of inter- but there Is reason to hope that It may fare
course between the two nations from better In your hands.
Unlike my generation. you know more
that of mutual hostility and deprecation about
Asia. You have a greater awareness
to tolerance. In so doing, the President ot
Its Importance to this nation and to the
has set the stage, in my judgment, for wor~d
. In 1942. !our months after Pearl
a peaceful evolution of United States- Harbor, !or example. an opinion poll found
Chinese relations which could serve well that sixty percent of a natlonaJ sample of
that generation of students whom I ad- Americans still could not locate either China.
dressed 4 years ago and their successor& or India on an outl!ne map o! the world.
Certainly that would not be the case today.
for many years to come.
Furthermore, you have not had the experiThere is no assurance, of course, that ence
of national trauma In moving abruptly
this evolution will occur but the door is from an era marked by an almost !awning
opened by the President's impending visit. benevolence toward China to one of thorough
Clearly, it. will take far more than a visit disenchantment. You were spared the fierce
of state to undo the knots of two decades hostll!tles which rent this nation Internally.
of a venomous acrimony. Nevertheless, I as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and security
know the Senate joins with me in wish- regarding China gave way to feelings of
ing President Nixon every success in the revulsion. hatred, and ln.secur!ty.
Your Ch!I'.ese counterparts, the young
endeavor which he is about to undertake. people
of today·s China-they are called the
Mr. Preshient, just for my own per- '"Heirs of the Revolut!on··-have a s!mllar
sonal benefit I wish to read the conclud- gap to bridge as they look across the Pacific.
ing portion of that speech which I gave Your generation tn China, too, has been conat the University of Montana 4 years ago: tained and ISolated. and Its view o! the United

PEKING
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on
the eve of the President's journey to
Peking I think it is 8JPro'pos to make a
few remarks. May I say that the ma.tter
of the President's visit to the People's
Republic of China has been a matter of
discussion between the President a.nd the
Senator from Montana for 3 years this
month.
During that time he has ment:daned his
desire to revive the Wa.rsa.w talks so that
contacts could continue to be ma'intained
between the Chinese and U.S. Ambassadors in the Capital of Poland, which
started, incidentally, in the summer of
1954 at the conclusion of the first
Geneva conference.
Second, he indicated that it was his
desire at an appropriate time to remove
the secondary and primary boycott
against the People's Republic of China,
To sum up, then, 1t seems to me that the
which has been in e!Iect since 1951 and
baste adjustment which Is needed In policies
which always was counterproductive.
China Is to make crystal clear
Third, he indicated it was his intention respecting
this government does not antlclpa.te,
to broaden the list of Americans who may that
much less does It seek, the overthrow of the
visit China, subject, of course, to ap- government of the Chinese mainland. In adproval by China.
dition, there Is a need to end the discriminaFourth, he stated that at an appropri- tion which consigns China to an Interior
ate time it was his intention to consider sta t us as among the Communist countries
the possihUity of allowing the Chinese, In this nation's p ollcles respecting travel and
trade. Finally, It ought to be made unequivon the same basis a.s the Soviet Union, to ocal
that we are prepared at aJl times to
be eligible for nonstrategic items.
meet with Chinese representatiVJlS-formally
Filth, he indicated that he would do or Informally-In order to consider differhis best to increase trade possibilities be- ences between China and the United States
over VIet Nam or any other question of
tween our two countries.
concern.
Sixth, he expressed the hope that he common
of this kind In the pollc!es of'
would be able to fulfill a long-held desire theAdjustments
nation, It s eems to me, require above all
to visit China, which he is now about eLse a fresh perspective . We need to see the
to do.
s ituation In Asia as It Is today, not as It ap-

States has been colored with the hates of
another time. It has had no contact with
you or, Indeed, with much of the world outside ChJna.
On the other hand, those young people
have grown up under easter conditions than
the older generation of Chinese who lived
their youth In years or continuous war and
revolution. It may be that they can !ace you
e.nd the rest o! the world with greater
equanamtty and a.ssurance than has been the
ca~e at any time In mt·dern Chinese history.
I urge you to think for yourselves about
China I urge you to tpproach, with a new
objectivity, that vast 1a.t!on, with Its great
)>OPulat!on of lndust ·tous and Intelligent
people. Bear In mind that the peace of Asia
and the world will dep,·nd on China as much
as It does on this nation, the Soviet Union
or any other, not because China Is Commu~
n!st but because China Is Ch1na.--tUnong the
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largest countries In the world and the most
populous.
Mao Tse-Tung remarked In an Interview
several years ago that "future events would
be decided by future generations." Insofar as
his words Involve the relationship of this
nation and China, whether they prove to be
a prophecy of doom or a forecast of a happier
future will depend not so much on us, the
"Old China Hands" of yesterday, but on yolL
the "New American Hands" of tomorrow.

So, Mr. President, again I wish to extend to the President every wish for his
success on this momentous journey.
I ask unanimous consent that the full
text of my remarks, verbatim, as delivered at the University of Montana on
March 29, 1968, be included at this point
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
LECTURE BY SENATOR Ml.KE MANSFIELD
MONTANA)

(D.,

(Sponsored by the Maureen and Mil<e Mansfield Endowment (The University of Montana Foundation) at the University of
Montana, Missoula, Montana, Friday,
March 29, 1968)
CHINA:

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

VIetNam Is heavy on the heart of the nation. The VIetnamese war Is a tragedy. It IS
a tragedy In the American lives which It
claims. It Is a tragedy In the death and devastation which, In the name of salvation, It
has spread throughout VIet Nam
My views on United States policy respectIng VIet Nam are no secret. I have stated
them, restated them, and elaborated them
many times. I have cautioned against an
ever-deepening mllltary Involvement In that
conflict. I am opposed to any Increase In It
today. I believe that the way out of a barbarous situation 1s not to go further Into lt.
The first step towards peace, In my judgment, Is to concentrate and consolidate the
U.S. mUitary effort and to escalate the peaceeffort, looking towards the negotiation of an
honorable end of the contlict.
That, In brief, 1s the way I !eel about VIet
Nam. That Is the way I have felt about It for
a long time. The President knows lt. The Senate knows lt. Montana knows lt.
What I have to say to you, today, touches
only Indirectly on VIet Nam. My remarks are
Intended to go beyond VIet Nam to what may
well be the roots of the war. In this first lecture of the series on International affairs, I
wish to address your attention to what 1s the
great void In the foreign relations of this nation-to the question of China..
As a. nation, we have lived through a. generation In only heresay association with a
third of the entire human race . At the inception of this void, we were enga.ged In a.
costly and Indecisive conflict In Korea-{)n
China's northeast frontier. Two decades later,
we are engaged once again In a costly and
Indecisive contlict, this time on China's
southeast frontier. These two great mlllta.ry
Involvements on the Chinese periphery are
not unrelated to the absence of relevant
contact between China and the United
States.
Sooner or later a tenuous truce may be
achieved In VIet Nam even as a truce was
achieved In Korea. In my judgment, however, there Will be no durable peace In Korea,
VIet Nam, or anywhere else in Asia unless
<there 1s a. candid confrontation With the
problems o! the Sino-U.S. relationship.
China needs peace 1f the potentials of Its
culture are to be realized. This ua.tton needs
peace for the same reason. In this day and
age, the world needs peace !or ctVUil'ft'd survival. You young people have the greatest
stake In peace. For that reason, I ask you to
look beyond VIetNam, behind Korea., to what

may well be the core of the fall ure o! peace
In Asla.--to the U.S.-Chlnese estrangement of
two decades.
In 1784, Robert Morris, a signer of the
Declaration of Independence, sent the first
American clipper ship to trade with China.
The year that President George Washington
took the oath of office, 1789, fourteen American ships were riding a.t anchor In the Pearl
River off Canton in South China.
There are no American ships In Chinese
ports today. There have not been !or almost
twenty years. In twenty years, hardly an
American doctor, scientist, businessman,
journalist, student, or even a tourist has set
foot In China.
Across the Pacific Ocean, we a.nd the
Chinese glare at one another, uncomprehendingly, apprehensively, and stlsplclously.
In the United States, there Is fear u! the
suddent march of Chinese armies Into South·
east Asia.. In China., there Is fear ot a tighter
American encirclement and American nuclear attack.
We see mUllens o! Chinese soldiers poised
on China's frontiers . We see leaders who
threaten In a most violent way. We see &n
Internal Chinese turmoll to confirm our fears
of lrratlona.Ilty and recklessness. Finally \\ e
see a groWing nuclear power, with the loom
lng spectre of a full-fledged Chinese Intercontinental ballistic missile force.
On the other hand, the Chinese see themselves surrounded by massive American mlll·
ta.ry power. They see U.S. naval, ground, aPd
air bases scattered through Japan, Korea
Ta.lwan, Okinawa, Guam, the Phlllpplnes,
and Thailand. They see over hal! a million
American troops In neighboring VIet Nam
and hundreds o! thousands more nearby
They see tremendous nuclear capabl!lty with
mtssUes zeroep In on Chmese cities. They
see the United States as "occupying" the
Chinese Island of Taiwan and supporting a
Chinese government whose declared aim I
the recapture of the mainland. And they
see, too, what they describe as a growing collusion between the United State' and the
Soviet Union, a country which they be!leve
1ntrlnges China's borders, threatens to uorrupt the Chinese revolution and exercises an
unwelcome Influence throughout Asia
We and the Chinese have not always looked
at one another with such baleful m1 tru t
The American Images of China have ftuctua.ted and shifted In an almost cyclical way
There has been the Image o! the China of
wisdom, Intelligence, Industry, piety, sto ctsm, and strength. This Is the China of Marco
Polo. Pearl Buck, Charlie Chan, a.nd heroic
resistance to the Japanese during World
War II.
On the other hand, there has been the
lm.&.ge ot the China of cruelty, barbarism,
violence, and faceless hordes. This Is the
China of drum-head trials, summary executions, Fu Manchu, and the Boxer Rebellion
the China that Is summed up In the phrase
"yellow perU."
Throughout our history, these two Images
have alternated, with first one predominant
and then the other. In the eighteenth century, we looked up to China. as an ancient
clvil12la.tlon-<~uperlor In many aspects of
technology, culture, and social order and
surrounded by an air o! splendid mystery.
Respect turned to contempt, however, with
Ch.l.n.a's quick defeat by the British In the
Opium War of 1840. There followed acts o!
humilla.tlon o! China such as partlclpa.t.lon
In extra-territorial treaty rights and the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
Attitudes shifted a.galn In the eazly twen
tleth century to one of benevolence largely
In consequence o! the lniluence o! mlsslo'1arles. There were more missionaries In China
!rom the United States than !rom a.ny other
country. More American mlsslonarlll6 served
In China than anyWhere else In the world
The Chinese became, for this nation, a
guld.ed, guarded, and adored people,
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Chine I< st...r. e to the Ja.panec>e InvaSion In 1937 produced another shift from
benevolenr.e to admiration. At the end of the
Second Ward Wa.r, adm.lratlon was displaced
by disappointment and frustration, as the
wa,·ttme tr ICe t tween Nat! nallst and Communist forces col! psed In cataclysmic Internal strife This nat<or. beca.me profoundly
dl enchanted with China a di•Pnchantment
which was replaced a.orupL!y In Hl49 by hostility.

'The hostility was largely a reaction, of
c .1rse to the comlug to power of a. Communist reg.me on the, Chln~e mainland. We
did not Interpret this event a.s a consequence
of the ll'a stve dll!lcwtles and the vast Inner
weaknesses o! a war-tom China. Rather, we
saw I almost as an affront to this nation.
We saw It as a treacherous extension or the
Soviet steam-roller policies which had reduced Eastern a.nd Central Europe to subservience at the end of World War II.
Then, In 1948, came a Communist coup
In Czechoslovakia. and the Soviet attempt to
blockade Berlin The triumph of a Communist government In China followed trnmedla.t y after these events In Europe. The
nation was shaken to Its fingertips.
Still, the press o! events continued relentlessly. In June 1950, the North Koreans
launched a st dden atUU:k on South Korea.
The Chinese forces Intervened In the war In
November or that year. The United States
was brought Into a major mUitary confrontation In wh ch !or the first time, the Chinese were enern!e:; and not allies.
After tt e e events, the assumptions of
American policy towards China. were revised.
An effort was 1nade to meet both the concern ard outrage respecting China which
existed In th nation and the revolutionary
m1 I ancy of the new Chinese regime in Asia.
Polley wa.s cast anew on the premise that
the govemmert c.:> the Chinese mainland
was a., aggressor which, subject to direct ns !rom Moscow, would use force to Impose
ter atl r l Conununlsm on Asia. Converse•Y •t was as umed that 1! the endorsement of
the free nations were withheld, this regime
whiCh was sale! to be "allen" to the Chinese
people- orne sort of overgrown puppet of
M
ow
ould wither and eventually collapse
On tt 1s ba.sls, recognition was not extended
to Pek ng. The official view was that the
Natlona, G"lvernment, which had retreated
to the Island o! Taiwan, continued to speak
for al '>! China We cut of! all trade with the
mainland and did wlla.t could be done to
encourge other countries to follow suit. In
a. slmUar fashion, we led a diplomatic oompalgn year aftl'r year against the seating
o! the Chlnel>e People's Republic In the
Un'ted Nations We drew an arc or mlllta.ry
alliances on the seaward side or China and
Ul derglrded tl em with the deployment of
ma.ss.ve Am rl an mUltary power In bases
throughout th< Western Pacific.
Much has happened to call Into question
the assun.p oru; In which these policies toward China have been rooted. In the first
place, the People'» Republic has shown Itself
tc be neither a part of a Communist monolith nor a. t>nrbon copy o! Soviet Russia.. The
!act l.s that of the numerous dlvl.slons which
nave artsen within the Communist world, the
dltferences l>etween Moscow and Peking have
been the most significant. They so remain
today a! though the more rasping edges o! the
t'Ontllct appear somewhat tempered by the
war In Viet Nam
At the same time, the government on the
ma.ln!and ha.s not only survlvP.d, It has provided China with a functioning leadership
Under Its direction, Chinese society has
achieved a degree of economic and scientific
progress, apparently sufficient for survival o!
an enormous and growing population and
sophisticated enough to produce thermo-nuclear explo.slons.
In the last two years, the so-called Cui-

s 1830

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE

which Is friendly, If not subservient. Peking
has not concealed, moreover. its desire for
the withdrawal of American military power
from Southeast Asia. It does not follow, however. that the price of peace In Southeast
Asia Is either Chinese domlnatwn or U.S.
military Intervention. That Is a black and
white oversimplification of a gray situation.
The fact Is that neither Burma on China's
border nor cambodia. have been ··enslaved"
by China, despite an association of many
years, despite periodic difficulties with the
great state to the north and despite an absence of U.S. support, aid, or protection.
These two nations have managed to survive In a state of detachment from the power
rivalries of the region. Furthermore, China Is
a signatory to the settlements which emerged
from the Geneva Conferences or 1954 and
1962 and which conta.ln at least a hope for
a middle way to peace in Indo-China.. So far
as I am aware, the Chinese have not been
found in direct or unilateral violation of
these agreements. It Is not Impossible that
a similar settlement, with Chinese participation, might be reached on VIetNam
Indeed, It Is to be devoutly hoped that
there can be a solution along these lines.
Unless It Is found. there is a very rea.! danger-as the Korean experience shows--that
the prolongation of war on China's frontiers
may well bring about another U.S.-Chlnese
armed confrontation.
Perhaps the most important element In
the rebuilding of staible relations with China
Is to be found In a solution of the problem
of Taiwan. It may help to come to grips with
this Issue, If It Is understood at the outset
that the Island of Taiwan Is Chinese. That Is
the position of the National Government of
the Republic of China. That Is the position
of the People's Republic of China. For a
quarter of a century, this common Chinese
posl tlon has been reinforced by the policies
and actions of the United States government
Since that Is the case, I do not believe
that a solution to the Taiwan question Is
facllltated by Its statement In terms of a
two-China policy, as has been suggested In
some quarters In recent years. The fact Is
that there Is one China which happens to
have been divided into two parts by events
which occurred a long time ago. Key !actors
In the maintenance of peace between the
separate segments have been the Interposition o! U.S. military power in the Taiwan
straits, and the strengthening o! the National Government of China by massive Injections o! economic and military ald.
This course was followed by the United
States for many reasons, not the least of
which was that It made possible a refuge for
dedicated allies and assoCiates In the war
against Japan. Most of all, however, It was
followed because to have permitted the closIng o! the breech by a military clash of the
two opposing Chinese forces would have
meant a massive bloodbath and, In the end,
the reklndllng of another great war In Asia.
However, the situation has changed In the
Western Paclf!.c. Taiwan is no longer abjectly
dependent !or Its survival on the United
States. Some of the passions o! the deep
Chinese political division have cooled with
the passing o! time. Another generation has
appeared and new Chinese societies, In effect,
have grown up on both sides of the Taiwan
Straits.
Is there not, then, some better way to confront this problem than threat-and-counterthreat between Island Chinese and mainland
Chinese? Is there not more better way to live
with this situation than by the armed truce
whl.ch depends, In the last analysis, on the
continued presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet In
the Taiwan Straits?
The questions cannot be answered until a.ll
Involved are prepared to take a fresh look at
the situation. It seems to me that It might be
helpful I! there could be, among the Chinese
themselves, an examination of the posslblll-

ties of Improving the climate. As l have IU•
ready Indicated, the proper framework rc ~
any such consideration would be an acceptance of the contentiOn of both Chinese
groups-that there Is only one China. and
Taiwan Is a part of It, In that context, the
questions at Issue have to do with the dichotomous situation as between mainland and
Island governments and the posslhll1ty or
bringing about constructive changes therein
by peaceful means.
There Is no cause t.o he sanguine about the
prospects of an approach of this kind. One
can only hope that time may have helped to
ripen the circumstances !or settlemeut. It Is
apparent, for example, that the concept
which held the Chinese government on
Taiwan to be the sole hope of China's redemption has grown less relevant with the
years. For Taiwan, therefore, to remain Isolated from the mainland Is to court the risk
that the Island will be left once again, 8.b It
has been on other occasions, In the backwll.Sh
of Chinese history.
The removal of the wedge of separation,
moreover, would also seem to accord with the
Interests of the mainland Chinese government. It does have a. legitimate concern In
the reassertion or the historic connection of
Ta.1wan and China It does have a concern In
ending the hostlle division which has been
costly and disruptive both within Chin~> and
In China's International relationships.
From the point of view or the Unite<!
States, too, there Is an interest In seeking a.
less tenuous situation. Progress In settling
the Taiwan question could contribute to a.
general relaxation of teru.lons in the Western
Pac1f!.c and, conceivably, even to resoiutlon o!
the conflict In VIet Nam. Certainly, It would
make possible a. reduction in the enormous
and costly overall defense burdens which
were assumed In Asian waters after World
War II and which, two decades later, stlll rest
on the shoulders of this nation
To sum up, then, it seems to me that the
basic adjustment which Is needed In policies
respecting China Is to make cryste.l cleil.l" that
this governm.ent does not a.ntlolpa.te. much
less does it seek, the overthrow of the government or the Chl.n.ese ro.a.!n.land. In addition,
there Is a need to end the dlscrlmlnatlon
which canstgns China to an lnfet1!or sta.tus as
among the Communist countries in this nation's policies respecting travel and tmde.
Fln.a.lly, it ought to be ma.de unequ!V'OC&l
that we a.re prepared at all times to meet With
Chinese representatives-formally or lnform.a.lly-tn order to consider dlffereru:es between China and the United States over Viet
Nam or any other question Of common concern.
Adjustments Of this ktnd 1n the pollcd.es of
the nation, It seem.s to m.e, require above all
else a fresh perspective. We need to see th~
sltua.tlon In Asia. as it Is today, not a.s It appeared twenty years a.go in the Hima.la.ya.n
upheaval of the Chinese revolution. We nee<.!
to see the sltua.tion not through the fog or
an old and stagnant hostility but in the light
Of the enduring Interests of the United States
In the Western Pacific.
In this context we will better be able to
f!..nd a.ppropt1late responses at app:roprla.te
times to the speolfic problems Of the Sinou.s. relationship, whether they h&ve to do
with U.N. representation or dlploma.tlc recognition or the offshore Islands or whatever
Without pr!Dr a.djustm.ent In perspective,
however, to seek to deal definitively with
these questions would be, to say the least,
an exerc:lse In futility.
I should emphasize before concluding that
It Is unlikely th&t there Will be any eager
Chinese resporu;es to inJtlatlves on our part.
Nevertheless, I see nothing to be lost far this
nation In trying to move along the lines
which have been suggested. Chinese intra.n~ence is no license for Amerlca.n lntra.nstgenoe. Our stake 1n the situation in the
Western Pa.cif!..c Is too large !or that sort of
inla.ntlle l.ndulgen.oe.
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I see great relevance In thinking deep! V of
the Issues which divide China and the United
s•.a.tes to see I! they can be recn.!>L in new and
uncluttered molds. Tiler~ Is every reason.
especially !or young people, to examine most
closely the premises or policy regarding China
which were enshrined almo~t two decadeo
ago. The fact is that tnc breakdown In
Chinese-U.S. relations was one of the great
fa.1lures of my generation and It Ls highly
doubtful that Its full repair shall be seen 1!1
my llfetlme. The problem. thE'refol't'. wlll fall
largely to you. It Is not a. particularly happy
Inheritance, but there Is rcasoP to hope that
1t may fare better In y'our hands.
Unlike my generation, you know more
a.oout As1a. You have a greater awareness of
Its Importance to this nation and to the
world. In 1942, four months CLfter Pearl Harbor, for example, an oplnloi! poll found that
s1xty percent of a national sample of Americans still could not locate either China. or
India. on an outline map of the world. Certainly that would not be the case today
Furthermore, you have not had the experience of national trauma. In movhig abruptly
from an era marked by an almost fawning
benevolence toward China to one of thorough
disenchantment. You were spared the fierce
hostilities which rent this nation Internally,
as a. sense of warmth, sympathy, and security
regarding China. gave way to feelings of revulsion, hatred, and Insecurity.
Your Chinese counterparts, the young people of today's China-they are called the
Heirs of the Revolutlon"-ha.ve a similar
gap to bridge as they look across the Pacific.
Your generation in China., too, has been cont.alncd and Isolated, and its view of the
United States has been colored with the hates
o! another tlme . It has had no contact with
you or, Indeed, with much of the world outside China.
On the other hand, those young people
hM·e grown up under easier conditions than
the older generation or Chinese who lived
their youth In years of continuous war and
revolution. It may be that they can face you
and the rest of the world with greater equanimity and assurance than has b~en the case
at any time In modern Chinese history
I urge you to think for yourselves about
cr,lna I urge you to approach, with a new
objectivity, that vast nation, with its great
population of Industrious and Intelligent
people. Bear In mind that the peace of Asia
and the world will depend on China. as much
a's It does on this nation, the Soviet Union,
or any other, not beca.U6e China. Is Communist but because China. is China-among the
largest coutrles In the world and the most
populous.
Mao Tse-Tung remarked In an Interview
several years ago that "future events v:ould
be decided by future generations." Insofar as
his words Involve the relationship of this
nation and China., whether they prove to be
a prophecy or doom or a. forecast of a happier
future will depend not so much on us, the
"Old China Hands" of yesterday, but on you,
the "New American Hands" of tomorrow.

Mr. SCOTI. Mr. President, the distinguished majority leader, in a speech
of some years ago, spoke with great foresight and intuitive wisdom. I congratulate him for that, and I am delighted
that he SJX>ke of the President's visit in
such hopeful terms .
We will all-the world will-watch
this meeting. not expecting great things
immediately, but recognizing that the
opening of a dialog with 800 million
people is itself a world-shaking event.
We may achieve--and I hope we will
achieve--..~ome easing, some solution, of
what the Germans call Kultw-kampf der
Menschheit, which means the cultw-aJ
struggle of mankind.
We have had this cultural struggle. I
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tural Devolution in China has rekindled
what has been a periodic expectation that the
Pelting government is on the verge o! collapse and the way 1s open !or a m1lltary return to the mainland o! the National Government on Taiwan. There seems to be little
doubt that the turmoil in China has caused
serloue disru ptions. What appears In confl.lct
In the cultural revolution, however, is not
the Pelting structure as such but the adequacy a! Its Ideological content. That would
be a far cry from the kind o! popular revulsion which might be expected to open the
doors to a new regime.
In any event, the worst o! the upheavals
within China appear to have ended months
ago, without any Irreparable break In the
continuity o! the government or the operations of the economy. It is the height or !oily
to envlBion, in the present situation, an occasion for the overthrow at the Peklng gover nment by external military pre6Sures. Indeed, what would be bet ter calcullllted to end,
overnight, the remaining ferment on the
mainland than a p lausible threat to the security o! China or an actual attack on Chinese
terrlltory?
I! the People's Republic, then, Is here to
stay, what of the ot her assumption on which
this nation's policy respecting China has long
been based? What o! the assumption that the
Chinese government 1s an expanding and
aggreaslve force? That It Is restrained tram
sweeping through Asia because we have
elected to meet Its challenge along the 17th
Parallel which divides the Nol'thern and
Southern parts a! Viet Nam?
In recent years, the present Chinese government has not s h own any great eagerness
to use force to spread Its ld'!Ology elsewhere
in Asia although Chinese armies have been
employed In assertion o! the traditional
borders o! China. To be s ure, China has given
enthusiastic encouragement and has promIsed to support wars o! national liberation.
However, China has not participated directly
In these wars and support, when It has been
forthcoming, has been limited and circumspect.
.
In VIet Nam, !or example, there Is certainly
Chlnese encouragement and aid !or the
North VIetnamese nnd the Vtet Cong. Chinese
In vo lvement, however, has been tar more
peripheral than our own. The enemy soldiers
with whom we are compelled to grapple are
all VIetnamese and, in fact, mostly South
VIetnamese. At e very stage of the war, the
assist ance we have provided to South VIet
Nam has far exceeded the aid from Chlna and
fr om all outalde sources to the VIet Cong
and Nol'th VIet Nam-both In terms of men
and materiel. There Is Chinese equipment In
South VIet Nam but there are no Chinese
battalions. Even In North VIet Nam, Chinese
manpower Is reported to amount, at most, to
one-tenth o! our forces In VIet Nam, and the
great bulk a! these Chinese are labor troops,
some Involved In air-defense but moat or
them engaged In repairing bomb damage to
roads, railroads, bridges, and the like.
Ohlneee actions 1n 'I1bet, and along the
Himalayan fron.tler of India, 6l'8 often clite<1
as evidence at lnllltant Ohineee Communist
~ 'I'be 1'ect 18, however, that Tibet
has been~. !or many decades, as fallIng wlt1hl.n China's over-aU boundaries. Not
only 'bhe Pek1ng government but also the
Ohln.eee NationAl Government on Taiwan
1ns1sta that 'nbet belongs to Ohlna. India
al&O acltnowledges suoh to be the case. Indeed, Amerlea.n policy has never recognlze<1
Tibet aa other t'ba.n Chinese territory.
In the dllse of the border war with India
in 1962, the Chinese Oommunlste oooupled
temtorlee W!oh, ~n. not only they, but
also tt.b.e ~ Nationalists, consldec" to be
Ch:lneee. It Is nat prec!Be1.y oharacter1Btlc of
a m111ta.nt e~. moreover, !01' a government to w1thdra.w 1ts military !oroee !rom
a territory which they have Invested. YM;,
tlbe Pek1De JO"I'DIIIUHlt did ao trom perts of

India which were occupied In 1962 aa well as
from North Korea.
As !or lndlrOOt ~ion through economic means. Ohlna has been able to exert
only a limited J.nfiuence, elth.er through aid
or rt;rade. In Mlica and, indeed, in southeast
Asia, where atternpte have been made to use
tm.de a.rul aid for polltlcal ends, the results
hlave not been consplcwously s1WC068!ul. The
!act 1s that moot of Ohlna's trade today roots
on a oommercial-ooonomlc base. It Is carrled
on large'ly w1~h t he non-COmmunist countries, Including, may I add, many of our
closest allies.
In abort, ·t o speak of China, today, as aggressively expla.nBd.ontst is to reepond to Chlnese words rather tha.n Chln.e6e actions. Th.at
1s not to say that China will not pose all
manner of thres.te tom.orrow. It there are not
en.ough nl3htmaree elrea.dy, oonslder the
proopecta when Oh.tn.a's n u.olear ca.pa.bllltles
will have been extensively developed, along
with a !ul1-fied@ed lnterrontlnental bell1stlc
missile force.
Of course, there Is an Immense potential
danger 1n Ohlna.; •b ut rthere Is also an IJ:nmenae
potential danger In every oth er powerful
nation In a world which has not yet ~earned
haw to maintain clvlllzed su rvival 1n a nuclear e.ge except on the razor's edge. Insofar
as Ohina Is concerned, the 11\lnd&mental
question !or us Is not whether 1t Is a danger,
real or .potentl81!.. The ! undwmental question
1s Vo'hether our preeen t rpollcles act to alleviate or to exacerbate the danger. Do we torestall the cta.nger by j ousting with the shadows
and sueplclons of the p ast? Do we help by a
continuance 1n pollcles w hich do little If anything to lift the h eavy curtaln o! mutual
Ignorance and hos t1llty?
Like It or not, the present Ohlne&e government Is here to stay. Like It or not, Chlna
Is a major power 1n Asia and Is on the way
to becoJlllng a nuclear power." Is It, therefore,
In this nation's Interest and 1n the Interest
o! world peace to 'Pilt aside, once <~.nd tor all,
what have been the p ersistent but futile
attempts to 18olate Ohlna? Is It, therefore, In
this nation's Interest and in •the tntere~t of
world peace to try conscientiously and consistently .t o do whatever we can do--and,
admittedly, It Is not much-to res~ the
relatloDBhlp wtth t he Chinese along more
construct! ve and stable lines? In abort, Is It
propitious for this na.tlon to try to do ~t.
1n fact, the policies of m ost of the other
Western democracies have alr eady long elnce
done regarding their Chlnese re'latlonshlps?
I must say that the deepening of the confilet Jn VIet Na.m makes m o re dlnlcult adjustments 1n policies respecting China. Indeed, the !Present c o urse o! events 1n VIet
iNam almost Insures that there shall be no
oha~s . It Is not easy to contemplate an
elllevla.tlon with any nation which oheers on
those who are eilg'Gged in lnftlotlng caaual ties
on Americans. Yet, It may well be that this
alleviation 1s an essential aspect of endlng
t he war a.nd, hence, .Anler lcan oasual ties.
Tha.t consideration, alone, It seems to me,
makes desirable lnltla.tlves towa.rds China. at
this time.
'I1here are several obvio us areas in whlc:h
these lnltlatlves wOUld h ave relevance Dtscrlmlnatory restriction on travel to Ohlna, tor
e~le, Is certainly one o! these areas. 'Ibe
Chlnese may or ma.y not adml t Americans
to their country, as they choose. But It Is
dlnlcult to '\Ulderstand why our own government should 1n any way, shape, or form seek
to stand In the Wfl.Y o! the attempts of
American citizens to 1breech the great wall
of est~ement between t he two nations. It
Is, Indeed, Ironic that during t he past three
years there have been more visits of Americans to North VIet Nam, a n a tion with
V>'hlch we are at wa.r, thnn to China In lthe
p1111t thll'teen years.
On the question at tnwel, It should be recalled that .the Chinese were the first to
suwest 1n 1966 !that Amer!oe.n Journalists

visit Chl.ll.a 'lhe ~ruggestlon was summarily
rejooted ,b y the then Secretary of S tate.
W·ben, 1&ter, It was decided to accept t he
&Uggeatlon, ·the Ch!uese had oha.nged t heir
minds. Since that tlme, this netlon has been
more 1nol1ned to ~>~~Be .the travel .barriers, on
the basis of oftlclal agreement !or exchanges
of persons, but the Ohlnese have shown n o
disposition ·to enter tn.to ~eemen,ts or, for
tha.t n~a~te1, to e.d.inlt Am.erlca.ns on any
basis.
In &ny evtnt, It seems to me that It Is In t he
positive Interest of this nation to enoourage
Americans, 1! they cap. gain entry, to t ravel
to China.. May I add, I mer not merely to t he
travel o! selected journalists, doctors, and
other specialists, as Is now the policy, but to
the travel o! any responsible American. In the
same fashion, It seems to me most appropriate to admit Chinese travelers to the United
States under the same oonditlons that pertain to visitors from other Communist cou n tries.
Trade Is another area In which long-standIng pollcles respecting China are open to serious question. Technically, this country stlll
maintains a.n embargo on all trad e with
China. The basis for this policy is compliance with a voluntary resolution of the
United Nations which was adopted at our
behest at the time of the Korean contl.lct. It
Is doubtful that the resolution ever carried
much weight among the trading nations of
the world. In any case, It has long since been
forgotten. Today, the principal nations In
the China trade In rough order of Importance are the United Kingdom, J apan, the
Soviet Union, West Germany, Australia , canada, Italy, and France. 0! all the great marltime nations, the United States alone clings
to a total trade embargo with China . Moreover, we are also the only nation In the world
which makes an eftort to enforce what can
best be described as a kind o! secondary boycott of re-exported Chinese products.
These policies have had little visible economic Impact, but they have had the most
serious political repercussions. It Is conceivable that, to the Chinese, the policies are
something of an Irritant. To friendly nations,
however, they have been a source of constant
friction. Most serious, their continuance o ver
the years has lnj,.Cted unnecessary veno m
Into the atmosphere of U.S.-Chlnese relations
Nor can It be said that the situation In
VIet Nam has compelled the pursuit of the
embargo and boyoott. The fact 1s tha t these
restrictions were in place before most AmerIcans ever heard of VIet Nam, and, certainly,
long before Americans became Involved In
the war. It the VIetnamese confilct Is now
seen as justlflcatton for lea ving these polIcies undisturbed, what 1s to be said of the
existing attitude toward trade with other
Co=unlst countries?
The !act Is that the European Communists
are providing North VIet Na m and t he VIet
Cong with sophisticated mllltary eq uipment
which, from all reports, exceeds In value the
aaststance which comes !rom China. On what
basis, then, Is It meaningful to permit and
even to encourage non-strategic t rade with
the European Communist countries while
holding to a closed-door policy on trade with
China? What constructive purpose Is served
by the distinction? Any rationalization of
relations with China, It seems to me, will
require an adjustment of thle dual approach.
We need to move In the d irection of equal
treatment of all Communist nations In trade
matters, whatever that treatmen t may be.
In any event, problems of travel and trade
are secondary obstacles In t he development
of a more stable relationship bet ween China
and the United States. There ar e other !ar
more significant dlmcultles. I refer, principally, to the question of Taiwan and to the
war in VIetNam.
'I'here Is no doubt t h at the Chinese government seeks In Viet Nam a government
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